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中国支付清算协会发布《智能体支付应用自律公约》_我的网站

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    Workers assemble solar photovoltaic modules at a smart manufacturing workshop of Ronma Solar Energy Group in Jindong district of Jinhua city, East China's Zhejiang Province, on July 28, 2026. Photo: VCG
China saw robust exports in electric vehicles (EV), lithium batteries and photovoltaic products, known as the "new three," in the first half of this year. More notably, robotics, artificial intelligence (AI) and innovative drugs, which represent the future direction of industrial development, are also emerging as new calling cards for China's foreign trade.
However, the impressive performance provoked unease among some Western media outlets and politicians. Some have deliberately portrayed China's rapid industrial development and strong competitiveness as a result of government subsidies, pushing the false claim that subsidies have created overcapacity and those low-priced Chinese products are flooding global markets. Such fallacies, which simply equate industrial subsidies with overcapacity, are not only logically flawed but also factually groundless.
In practice, many countries adopt industrial policies tailored to their national conditions and development needs, such as providing research and development (R&D) subsidies for emerging industries and risk related subsidies for agriculture.
Well-designed industrial subsidies can help address market failures, promote technological innovation and environmental protection, reduce poverty and support balanced development, rather than cause so called "overcapacity."
Multiple reports by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development have noted that the number of industrial policies worldwide has grown rapidly over the past five years, with R&D subsidies, tax incentives and low interest loans for emerging industries becoming common international practices.
Forcibly linking industrial subsidies to "overcapacity" is, in essence, a political manipulation based on double standards. The US, for example, plans to provide $750 billion in various subsidies from 2022 to 2031 under its Inflation Reduction Act. Subsidized EVs are subject to requirements such as production and sales in the US or North America, effectively excluding other WTO members. US industrial subsidies for AI are even greater than those of all other countries combined.
Similarly, according to incomplete statistics, the European Commission is expected to provide more than 1.44 trillion euros ($210 billion) in various subsidies between 2021 and 2030. The EU's Industrial Accelerator Act links local content directly to financial support through "Made in EU" requirements, creating serious investment barriers and institutional discrimination.
Have these massive subsidies been labeled as causing "overcapacity"? The answer is no. While claiming that China's industrial subsidies lead to so-called overcapacity, these countries are themselves providing massive subsidies to their own industries. Such double standards amount to selective accusations targeting China, aimed at politicizing trade and economic issues and weaponizing industrial policy.
At a deeper level, accusations that "China's industrial subsidies cause overcapacity" are merely a pretext, reflecting growing anxiety and fear over the rising competitiveness of Chinese industries.
Looking back at the repeated hype in Western media, the criticism has consistently targeted China's most globally competitive industries, including new-energy vehicles, photovoltaics and power batteries. This exposes the real intention of shifting the blame for their own lagging industrial development onto China while stepping up restrictions against Chinese industries.
China's breakthroughs in these industries have been driven by advances in homegrown technologies, complete industrial and supply chains, and robust market competition, rather than by policy subsidies as some have claimed.
In recent years, China has taken multiple steps to regulate and improve its subsidy policies, from reviewing and correcting inappropriate local subsidies to exploring a unified negative list mechanism for local fiscal subsidies. China applies subsidies equally to all market entities, including foreign invested enterprises, strictly follows WTO rules, and continues to improve the compliance, effectiveness and transparency of its subsidy policies.
Rather than fabricating and hyping baseless claims about subsidies and obsessing over building trade barriers, certain Western media outlets and politicians should focus on addressing their own weaknesses and increasing investment in research and development. They should embrace healthy market competition with an inclusive mindset, promote mutual benefit through greater openness, and win markets and drive progress through genuine innovation.
This was compiled and translated by the Global Times English edition based on an article published in the "Chisu Jinsheng" economic commentary column of the People's Daily on August 10, 2026.
。    　　北京8月24日电（记者吴雨）8月24日，中国支付清算协会发布《智能体支付应用自律公约》，在强化行业自律、保护消费者合法权益等方面作出一系列安排，旨在促进智能体支付应用安全、合规、可持续发展。　　当前，人工智能技术加速迭代演进，部分支付清算机构已开展智能体支付探索实践，但行业缺乏统一、可参考的标准规则。

二 | 为响应相关诉求，中国支付清算协会在中国人民银行指导下，制定并发布《智能体支付应用自律公约》，旨在通过柔性自律治理手段凝聚行业共识，助力行业守正创新发展。　　记者了解到，在智能体管理方面，公约要求会员单位基于“了解你的客户（KYC）”进一步探索建立“了解你的智能体（KYA）”机制。在授权管理方面，公约要求会员单位明确智能体支付应用的授权边界，与用户签订责任清晰的授权协议。在防范风险方面，公约要求会员单位建立分级分类管理机制，通过交易限额等方式加强资金安全管理。　　协会有关负责人介绍，公约将保护消费者合法权益摆在突出位置，要求会员单位积极开展消费者教育，通过建立投诉受理机制切实维护消费者合法权益；为消费者提供便捷的智能体支付应用关闭、信息查询的通道，保障其自主选择权。　　公约还提出，会员单位应坚持开放合作，共同维护公平、开放、健康的智能体支付应用生态，不得通过排他合作、强制捆绑、低价补贴等方式限制用户选择，不得扰乱市场经营秩序。

三 | 　　协会有关负责人表示，在智能体自主发起支付交易的应用落地实施前，会员单位应向中国支付清算协会报备，充分开展业务有效性、技术安全性、伦理符合性等方面评估验证，配套人工服务、风险监控、舆情监测、应急处置、回退机制等保障措施，防范智能体支付应用风险。

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Published on:09:18:41